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AFTER THE CRIME: REWARDING OFFENDERS’
POSITIVE POST-OFFENSE CONDUCT
Paul H. Robinson and Muhammad Sarahne*

Although an offender’s conduct before and during the crime is the traditional
focus of criminal law and sentencing rules, an examination of post-offense
conduct can also be important in promoting criminal justice goals. After the
crime, different offenders make different choices and have different experiences,
and those differences can suggest appropriately different treatment by judges,
correctional ofﬁcials, probation and parole supervisors, and other decision
makers in the criminal justice system.
Positive post-offense conduct ought to be acknowledged and rewarded, not
only to encourage it but also as a matter of fair and just treatment. This essay
describes four kinds of positive post-offense conduct that merit special recognition and preferential treatment: the responsible offender, who avoids further
deceit and damage to others during the process leading to conviction; the debtpaid offender, who suffers the full punishment deserved (according to true
principles of justice rather than the sentence actually imposed); the reformed
offender, who takes afﬁrmative steps to leave criminality behind; and the
redeemed offender, who out of genuine remorse tries to atone for the offense.
The essay considers how one might operationalize a system for giving special
accommodation to such offenders. Positive post-offense conduct might be
rewarded, for example, through the selection and shaping of sanctioning methods, through giving preference in access to education, training, treatment, and
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other programs, and through elimination or restriction of collateral consequences of conviction that continue after the sentence is completed.
Keywords: post-offense conduct, punishment theory, reformed offender, redeemed offender, criminal sanctions, collateral consequences of conviction
INTRODUCTION

An elaborate set of criminal law and sentencing rules scrutinize an offender’s
conduct leading up to and during an offense. Often overlooked is the importance of what offenders do after the offense. They might behave very badly,
perhaps fabricating evidence to destroy the credibility of a rape victim, for
example. Or they might behave almost admirably, by turning themselves in to
police and with sincere remorse trying to atone for their offense. And there are
many shades of propriety and impropriety along this continuum of postoffense behavior. A rational criminal justice system ought to encourage positive post-offense behavior, and acknowledge and reward it when it occurs.
This essay examines ﬁve kinds of positive post-offense behavior and
suggests that four of them should trigger an offender’s special treatment
within the criminal justice system. It concludes that recognition and
reward of some categories of positive post-offense conduct would serve not
only to encourage such conduct but also to advance broader criminal
justice goals, such as reinforcing societal norms and enhancing the justness
of criminal liability and sentencing rules.

I. POST-OFFENSE CONDUCT IN THE LITERATURE

The role of post-offense conduct in sentencing has been subject to substantial scholarly writing, in which different punishment theories and distributive principles view the relevance of this role differently. Strict desert
retributivists maintain that punishment ought to be proportionate to the
gravity of the committed offense, for which the actual or potential harm
and the offender’s culpability are the primary factors to assess.1 Retributive
1. See MARGARET DE G UZMAN , SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE OF HUMANITY : GRAVITY
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 186 (2020); GUYORA BINDER ,
CRIMINAL LAW 90 (2016).
AND THE
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desert is backward-looking, in that judgments about the seriousness of the
offense focuses on past events and wrongdoings, and thus it has been
argued that “the gravity of the wrong is not inﬂuenced by anything that
takes place subsequent to the wrong-doing, such as the offender’s profound
repentance.”2 Therefore, pure retribution considers post-offense behavior
as irrelevant to the deserved punishment, since the offender cannot change
his past level of culpability, during the commission of the offense, or undo
the harm he has already inﬂicted.3
The objection to taking account of post-offense conduct within the
sentencing process stems from several grounds. First and foremost, it might
seem inconsistent with principles of fairness and equality, as it leads to
sentencing disparities and the imposition of different sanctions on those
who commit the same offense under the same circumstances.4 Others
oppose considering post-offense conduct because such conduct could be
triggered by many reasons, not necessarily indicating any moral development or lesser culpability.5 Moreover, some may argue that post-offense
considerations undercut the gravity of the offense as the crux of assessing
the deserved punishment, and may increase the punishment based on, for
example, the failure to acknowledge guilt or cooperate with the
authorities.6
However, contemporary retributive approaches ascribe an importance to post-offense conduct so long as it has an effect on the severity
of the offense. For instance, John Tasioulas argues that the main
exception to the exclusion of actions and events taking place after the
crime from the evaluation of the offense’s gravity is when repentance
occurs immediately following the commission of the wrongdoing. According to him, in such case, where the offender is immediately
appalled by his act, apologizes, tries to amend the harm done to the
victim, and voluntarily surrenders to the authorities, repentance would
2. John Tasioulas, Repentance and Punishment, 81(2) PHILOSOPHY 279, 308 (2006).
3. Hadar Dancing-Rosenberg & Netanel Dagan, Retributarianism: A New Individualization of Punishment, 13 CRIM . L. & PHIL . 129, 130 (2019) [hereinafter Dancing-Rosenberg
& Dagan, Retributarianism]; Julian Roberts & Hannah Maslen, After the Crime, PostOffense Conduct and Penal Censure, in LIBERAL CRIMINAL THEORY : ESSAYS FOR ANDREAS
VON HIRSCH 87, 89 (A.P. Simester, Antje du Bois-Pedain, & Ulfrid Neumann eds., 2015).
4. Dancing-Rosenberg & Dagan, Retributarianism, supra note 3, at 132.
5. Roberts & Maslen, supra note 3, at 107.
6. Id. at 107–08.
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be a factor mitigating culpability.7 Similarly, Roberts and Malsen have
contended that in a desert framework, certain commendable postoffense actions—namely ones affecting harm, culpability, or deserved
censure—should have a mitigating role and be legitimately considered
by the sentencing court.8 This approach is even broader than the one
presented by Tasioulas, since it does not conﬁne the time frame for the
relevant post-offense behaviors.
Generally speaking, recent years have witnessed the emergence of a new
individualization of punishment trend in retributive penal theory—termed
“retributarianism” by Dancing-Rosenberg and Dagan—which shares with
strict retributivism the reliance on retribution as the sole rationale and
justiﬁcation for punishment, yet seeks to expand the boundaries of retributivsm by opening the door to the possibility of taking into account also
post-offense conduct that is not directly related to the past offense, and not
for utilitarian reasons, but in order to assess the proportionate deserved
punishment and the offender’s culpability.9 For example, character retribution theory is a product of this broad trend. This theory states that
retribution is not a function of the wrongdoing only, but also of the
quality of the wrongdoer’s moral character. In determining the proportionate punishment, character retributivism suggests examining the offender’s
entire moral personality and the totality of his moral being, instead of
focusing solely backward on the moment of committing the wrongful act,
thus extending the time frame for gauging the deserved punishment. Punishment, under character retributivism, would take into consideration the
development of the offender’s character over time, including positive postoffense actions and changes in his personality—like taking responsibility,
expressing remorse, apology, penance, and making amends—which may
imply his transformation into a meaningfully different person who deserves
less punishment.10
On the other hand, utilitarian theories of punishment are more tolerant
not only with respect to taking into account post-offense conduct in the
sentencing process, but also in that examining such conduct is in fact
7. Tasioulas, supra note 2, at 308.
8. Roberts & Maslen, supra note 3, at 96–107.
9. Dancing-Rosenberg & Dagan, Retributarianism, supra note 3, at 132–33.
10. Netanel Dagan & Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg, Character Retribution as a Brake on
Risk-Driven Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE , RISK AND REVOLT AGAINST UNCERTAINTY 69, 75–76 (John Pratt & Jordan Anderson eds., 2020).
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necessary to achieve some utilitarian punishment purposes. For instance,
general deterrence may accommodate cooperation with the police that
promotes the goal of cost-effective crime prevention, on which general
deterrence is premised.11 Under general deterrence, post-offense actions
reducing the harm would also have a mitigating role, since the greater the
harm, the more important are deterrence and harsher punishments.12
Moreover, post-offense conduct is obviously highly relevant to a court
pursuing special deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, under which
sentences are predicated mainly upon speculations about offenders’ future
behavior, rather than the committed offense, and may even require indeterminate sentences.13 Utilitarian precepts underlie the use of post-offense
conduct in mixed theories as well. For example, limiting retributivism is
a theory according to which principles of retribution and just desert deﬁne
the outer bounds of the sentence and set a proportionate sentencing range
depending on the gravity of the offense, whereas crime-control utilitarian
principles such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation may inﬂuence the precise amount and nature of the punishment within the said
range.14 Limiting retributivism permits looking at post-offense conduct for
imposing a punishment within the deserved sentencing range, rather than
affecting its lower and upper limits, given a utilitarian justiﬁcation for
that.15
It is noteworthy, though, that not all utilitarians agree upon the role that
post-offense conduct should play in sentencing. Some argue that the certainty of the punishment contributes to deterrence more than the severity
of the punishment. Based on this premise, sentencing should avoid the
consideration of unforeseeable contingencies such as post-offense behavior
of the offender.16

11. Binder, supra note 1, at 90.
12. DeGuzman, supra note 1, at 186.
13. Id.; Binder, supra note 1, at 90–91.
14. See Richard Frase, Limiting Retributivism: The Consensus Model of Criminal Punishment, in T HE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Michael Tonry ed.,
2003); Christopher Slobgin, Limiting Retributivism and Individual Prevention, in T HE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE OF PUNISHMENT (Farah
Focquaert ed., 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3318321.
15. Dancing-Rosenberg & Dagan, Retributarianism, supra note 3, at 143.
16. Michael O’Hear, Is Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing Uniformity?, 89(2)
MARQUETTE L. REV . 305, 309–10 (2005).
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The relevance of post-offense conduct to punishment has been
endorsed in practice by several court opinions, statutes, and sentencing
guidelines across the jurisdictions. About a decade ago, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Pepper v. United States,17 made it clear
that sentencing courts may consider a very wide range of information
about the offender, more than the particular acts by which the offense was
committed, including the offender’s life, characteristics, and propensities.
This principle was incorporated by the legislature in § 3661 of the United
States Federal Code.18 Additionally, the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines expressly recognize the possibility of reduction in punishment due to positive post-offense conduct, like the acceptance of
responsibility for the offense,19 the disclosure of an offense that would
have otherwise remained undiscovered,20 and post-offense rehabilitative
efforts.21 The role of post-offense behavior is also recognized on the state
level. For instance, statutory provisions in many states authorize courts to
provide mitigation in punishment where the offender assists law enforcement authorities22 or substantially compensates the victim in a civil
procedure.23
Sadly enough, in spite of the scholarly literature, court opinions, and
sentencing statutes and guidelines in many jurisdictions with regard to the
role of post-offense conduct, it is not uncommon, as will be demonstrated
in this essay, to see the system failing to recognize and reward offenders for
their positive post-offense deeds. Therefore, this essay aims to suggest
a mechanism by which certain offenders who engage in positive behaviors
after the crime may be rewarded. Unlike the existing literature described
above, which addresses post-offense conduct only through the prism of
punishment, our goal is to propose and show many other ways to recognize
such conduct.
17. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3661.
19. U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2010).
20. U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual § 5k2.16 (2004).
21. U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2010).
22. Paul H. Robinson, Sean E. Jackowitz, & Daniel M. Bartels, Extralegal Punishment
Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such
Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND . L. REV . 737, 744 (2012)
[hereinafter Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors].
23. Id. at 765.
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II. DOING A GOOD DEED

One kind of positive post-offense conduct is doing a good deed for
someone else. Pierre Johnson is awaiting his day in court for drug charges
of which he is ultimately convicted when a serious ﬁre starts in a neighbor’s home. Johnson climbs through a window and rescues the
wheelchair-bound woman.24 Michael Rogers has been in and out of
prison for his entire adult life but at the moment is living on the streets.
There is little reason to think his past prison cycling will change. He is at
a busy shopping center when a knife-wielding man begins attacking
people. Three people are wounded, one is killed. When police arrive they
too are attacked. Roger uses a grocery cart to ram the attacker and knock
him down, saving lives.25 Lamont Cunningham, who spent three years in
jail, is currently awaiting trial on a domestic battery charge when he
comes across a woman being abducted by a man disguised as a postal
worker. Cunningham hits the man over the head with a 75-pound ﬂower
pot. When the man ﬂees, Cunningham chases him down and holds him
until police arrive.26
Such good deeds ought to be praised and perhaps rewarded, but there is
little reason to do so through the criminal justice system. The offender
ought to be acknowledged and rewarded as any other citizen would be for
doing the same thing. But the deed does not alter the wrongdoing of the

24. Minnesota Felon Rewarded for Heroic Act, Post Bulletin (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.
postbulletin.com/archives/minnesota-felon-rewarded-for-heroic-act/article_9a6241b5-dd0357f6-a306-4559571ed6cf.html. For another example, in a burglary case, the offender stole
from an apartment goods that included video tapes. Upon viewing the movies, he found
they were videos made by a local soccer coach who was sexually abusing young athletes. The
offender contacted authorities and turned over the evidence even though doing so exposed
him to prosecution as a serial thief. Al Goodman, Burglar Finds Child Sex Abuse on Tapes He
Took, So He Points Out Suspect, Police Say, CNN (Dec. 19,2013), https://www.cnn.com/
2013/12/19/world/europe/spain-burglar-child-pornography/index.html.
25. Melbourne’s ‘Trolley man’ Michael Rodgers in Trouble Again, T HE WEST AUSTRALIAN
(Nov. 30, 2018), https://thewest.com.au/news/australia/melbournes-trolley-man-michaelrodgers-in-trouble-again-ng-b881037380z.
26. Brian Brueggemann, Ex-Con Saved Woman from Fake Carrier—Man Served Time for
Felonies, BELLEVILLE NEWS -DEMOCRAT (Sep. 27, 2002), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.
proxy.library.upenn.edu/apps/news/document-view?p¼AWNB&docref¼news/
0F6552BD4A449852.
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offender’s crime.27 Empirical research about ordinary people’s judgments
of justice support the conclusion that good deeds unrelated to an offense
ought to have little effect on punishment for the offense.28
Where a good deed is related to the offense, the standard liability and
punishment rules will take it into account; no special accommodation is
required. In some cases, for example, the good deed may cause us to alter
our interpretation of the case facts, concluding, for example, that perhaps
the defendant didn’t intend the harm that occurred, and thus ought to be
liable for only a lesser offense. Or the good deed may actually change the
harmfulness of the offense conduct. For example, Motti Ashkenazi steals
a backpack at the beach, his standard way of getting money for his drug
habit. On this occasion, however, it turns out that the backpack is a terrorist
bomb intended to kill and maim the beachgoers, and his thievery saves
many lives. He notiﬁes police, who disarm the bomb.29
While good deeds by offenders require no special rules, the cases do have
an important lesson to teach that is highly relevant to criminal justice and
our proposals to reward offenders who engage in positive post-offense
conduct: it is simplistic and misleading to think in terms of “good people”
and “bad people,” or in terms of “criminals” versus the rest of us. Human
nature is more complex than that. Everyone’s life is ﬁlled with a series of
moral decisions, and different people’s patterns of decision-making are
different. Both “criminals” and “noncriminals” alike have probably made
bad choices that would be judged criminal if the criminal justice system

27. A good deed in furtherance of one of the statuses described below—as an expression
of reform or atonement, for example—obviously would need to be taken into account
under our proposal.
28. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors, supra note 22, at 820.
29. Beach Terror Attack Averted After Thief Finds Bomb in Bag, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC
AGENCY (Jun. 23, 1997), https://www.jta.org/1997/06/23/default/beach-terror-attack-averted-after-thief-ﬁnds-bomb-in-bag. In the bomb thief case, the fact that lives are saved makes
the conduct objectively justiﬁed, so the offender ought to be liable only for attempt
liability—as would any unknowingly justiﬁed actor. Paul H. Robinson, The Bomb Thief
and the Theory of Justiﬁcation Defenses, 8(3) CRIM . L.F. 387 (1998). In another similar case,
a repeat offender stole a van in a crowded Brooklyn neighborhood, only to realize that the
van contained a bomb. Knowing that the bomb could go off at anytime, the thief continued
to drive the vehicle until he arrived at an uninhabited waterfront area and then called the
police. Robert Evans, 7 Ruthless Criminals Who Turned Good When Nobody Was Looking,
CRACKED (Sep. 4, 2011), http://www.cracked.com/article_19393_7-ruthless-criminals-whoturned-good-when-nobody-was-looking.html.
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were all-knowing and ever-present. What the good-deed cases help reveal is
that there is the possibility for doing good in all people (and the possibility
for doing bad). Criminal law must be in the business of punishing bad
choices, not writing off bad people. This is relevant to our present discussion because we will propose that there is societal value in giving recognition and reward even to “criminals”; as we punish their bad conduct, so too
should we reward their good conduct.

III. OFFENDERS BEHAVING BADLY

While some offenders may do good deeds, other offenders take the opportunity after the offense to add to the societal harm of their offense by
deceiving and injuring others when dealing with authorities, witnesses,
victims, and others in an effort to avoid the conviction that they know
they deserve: falsely accusing innocent persons of committing the offense,
lying to investigators and the court, unfairly humiliating or falsely accusing
victims or witnesses in order to undermine their credibility, or a variety of
other bad behaviors calculated to avoid their deserved liability.
Seventeen-year-old Lindsey Armstrong is in court testifying about being
raped in a public park. To undermine her testimony, the defense produces
the girl’s underwear. Her mother recounts: “They said she had to hold up
her thong to prove that her underwear wasn’t ripped, to make out she was
a liar.” The underwear had “Little Devil” written on it, and the victim is
instructed to read the words aloud in court. The victim becomes so upset
that she is uncertain she can continue to testify. Two weeks after the trial
ends, Armstrong kills herself. Her parents say she felt the trial had
“humiliated and degraded” her and that she had been “raped all over
again.”30
30. Auslan Cramb, Mother of Teenager Who Took Her Own Life after Rape Trial
‘Appalled’ by Girl’s Thong Being Used Against Her in Irish Case, T HE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 19,
2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/19/mother-teenager-took-life-rape-trialappalled-girls-thong-used/. In a similar case, Darryl Rosen was a Sacramento police ofﬁcer
who used his privileged position to sexually assault women he encountered. At trial the
defense aggressively cross-examined the victims in pursuit of his technical defense that he
didn’t touch them but instead compelled them to touch him. As one of his many victims
told the court: “I never wanted to testify at trial and have to relive the acts of the assault,
questions about my character and be made to feel that I had somehow done something
wrong or that it was my fault.” Case of Darryl Rosen, T HE AWARENESS CENTER / JEWISH
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Daniel Maoz is convicted of two murder charges based on what the
judge describes as “a set of facts that wouldn’t disgrace a horror ﬁlm at the
cinema.” A gambling addict, Maoz murdered his parents by stabbing each
of them dozens of times in order to use their inheritance to pay off gambling debts. During his trial, in an attempt to explain the DNA evidence
implicating him, Maoz falsely accuses his identical twin brother, whom it is
determined was not at the crime scene.31 In a similar blaming-others case,
James Wagner kills a teen, then blames it on three younger boys whom he
says united in lying against him.32
Jefferson Sumpter ﬁnds a woman stranded by a winter storm and offers
her a ride to safety. When she accepts, Sumpter rapes and beats her. At his
rape trial, he testiﬁes falsely, claiming it was not rape, and blaming the
victim: “she should have known better than going with a stranger. And we
all know that women and the media make up rape allegations. . . . She isn’t
dead and she should appreciate that.”33 Ultimately, physical evidence and
his own statements conclusively prove the rape.
Sometimes the bad behavior is motivated less by a desire to escape
deserved punishment and more by greed or a desire to simply inﬂict more
pain and suffering. Karen Cotton is seen on security camera footage stealing the backpack of a store clerk. The police quickly apprehend her and
return the backpack, but Cotton has already removed the employee’s
engagement ring from the bag. Even after her conviction and despite
repeated pleas, she refuses to return the ring to the clerk.34
Fred Hammer owes his nephew $1,605 in back wages. When the young
man threatens to sue, Hammer kills him. Before he can be convicted for
the offense, he is convicted and imprisoned for three other shootings. The
COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ABUSE /ASSAULT (Oct. 22, 2004), http://theawarenesscenter.
blogspot.com/2004/10/case-of-darryl-rosen.html.
31. Stuart Winer, Man who Murdered Parents Given Two Life Terms, TIMES OF ISRAEL
(Jul. 1 2013), https://www.timesoﬁsrael.com/man-who-murdered-parents-given-two-lifeterms/.
32. Hail Mary, Defendant Called Victim, Liar, AP, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Oct. 5,
1993).
33. Daniel Tepfer, Rapist Blames Victim, Women and Media for his Crime , CT POST
(Sep. 21, 2018), https://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Rapist-blames-victim-women-andmedia-for-his-13247642.php.
34. Vince Cestone, Cops: Women Who Stole Engagement Ring from Jack in the Box Won’t
Give It Back, KRON4 (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.kron4.com/news/cops-women-whostole-engagement-ring-from-jack-in-the-box-wont-give-it-back/.
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nephew’s body is never found, and Hammer refuses to divulge its location.
While in prison, however, he agrees to reveal the location for $15,000,
which the family pays.35
Milton Brown is in court for a series of sexual assaults for which he is
ultimately convicted. He elects to act as his own attorney, thus limiting the
judge’s ability to interfere when he leads two of his victims through questioning that forces them to relive their ordeals for no apparent legal beneﬁt
to the defense but instead apparently for his own pleasure and
amusement.36
Clearly, all defendants have the right to vigorously defend themselves,
but the innocent defendant and the guilty defendant—and the defendant
knows which he is—stand in importantly different situations. The innocent defendant may well have to do things in speaking the truth that will
injure others. That is the price that we necessarily must pay for a criminal
justice system dedicated to avoiding injustice. But the guilty offender
knows when he is fabricating and lying, and knows when he is falsely
implicating or humiliating others in order to mislead authorities or the
court. Being investigated for a crime does not create a right in the guilty
offender to afﬁrmatively deceive authorities or needlessly injure innocent
others.
Unfortunately, there is sometimes confusion on this important point.
For example, it has been argued that although self-protective perjury may
be wrong, “the choice seems to be one for which excuse is classically
appropriate.”37 But this view reﬂects a misunderstanding of excuse law
and theory, the coercion or duress excuse in particular. Not every temptation or feeling of internal pressure provides the basis for excuse. We don’t
give a duress defense to the convenience store robber because he was feeling
the pressure of needing his next drug ﬁx. One may gain a duress excuse
35. Monte Mitchell, Hammer Pleads Guilty in Nephew’s Death, WINSTON -SALEM
JOURNAL (NC) (Dec. 8, 2010), https://infoweb-newsbank-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/
apps/news/document-view?p¼AWNB&docref¼news/13402E2BAD1C2438.
36. Brian Flynn, Free: Vile Rapist Who Grilled His Victims in Court—Early Release
Shocker Exclusive, T HE SUN (London, England) (Jan. 17, 2012), https://infoweb-newsbankcom.proxy.library.upenn.edu/apps/news/document-view?p¼AWNB&docref¼news/
13C56CAEAAAE1238.
37. William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM . L. REV . 1227, 1254
(1988). See also Lisa Kern Grifﬁn, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning,
97 CAL . L. REV . 1515, 1551–53 (2009).

377

378 |

NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL. 24 | NO. 3 | SUMMER 2021

only if the offender is coerced by a threat that “a person of reasonable
ﬁrmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”38 Responsible
offenders prove every day that it is possible to resist the temptation to lie to
investigators and the court.
Further, this peculiar excuse argument fails to take account of the fact
that it is the offender himself or herself who created the threat of punishment by committing the offense. We might provide a defense for the
use of force against an attacker, but not if the defendant brought about
the attack by breaking into the person’s home. Indeed, the duress excuse
is by statute commonly “unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself
in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to
duress.”39 A person who commits an offense is aware of a risk that he may
be prosecuted.
This peculiar claim of an excuse defense for a guilty offender lying to
avoid conviction apparently rests in part on the view that such lying is
a “victimless crime.”40 But the victim here is society generally rather than
a particular individual. It is hard to see how society being the victim
supports such a defense. Under this misguided view, is the offender who
ﬁles a false tax return to hide his offenses—a victimless crime—also to have
a defense? Also, a defense for the offender who bribes government ofﬁcials
to avoid conviction—another victimless crime? Lying to avoid deserved
liability is neither justiﬁed nor excused, but only a continuation of the
offender’s wrongdoing.
Another writer argues: “[T]here is something potentially unfair about
making it a crime for one suspected of criminal activity to shield himself
from government scrutiny. Indeed, it is ironic that the more serious the
crime being covered up, and the more severe the penal consequences, the
stronger is the defendant’s claim of self-preservation and, arguably, the less
wrongful is his act of covering up.”41 It is one thing to remain silent and to
refuse to do anything that might help the government convict you, but it is
quite another to afﬁrmatively commit additional offenses in order to escape
deserved punishment. The more serious the original offense, the greater the

38. Model Penal Code § 2.09(1).
39. Model Penal Code § 2.09(2).
40. Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1254.
41. Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM . CRIM . L. REV . 9, 33 (2005).
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societal interest in sanctioning it, and the greater the societal injury in the
use of criminal means to afﬁrmatively hide it.

I V . T H E R E S P O N S I B L E O F F E N D E R–—A V O I D I N G
FURTHER DECEIT AND DAMAGE TO OTHERS

The temptation is clear for a guilty offender to deceive and to injure others
in an attempt to save himself. The offender who avoids this kind of
misbehavior ought to be acknowledged and rewarded for that responsible
choice. Yet, it is not uncommon for the current system to simply ignore
such positive post-offense conduct by such a responsible offender.
Indeed, the system’s indifference to an offender acting responsibly after
the offense can sometimes be seen even in cases where the offender goes
beyond avoiding the bad behavior described above to hide his wrongdoing
and takes afﬁrmative steps to reveal his or her crime. Having become
remorseful about what she has done, Deborah Sena goes to police and
reports the sexual abuse of eight children by a man, another woman, and
herself. She does not want the children to have to testify in court, so she
pleads guilty. She ends up getting the same sentence and the same conditions
as the other woman who did not go to police and who was a more active and
longer-standing participant.42 We do not propose that the responsible
offender get less punishment than he or she deserves for the offense,43 but
there are many other ways in which responsible offenders can be rewarded
for their positive post-offense conduct, as discussed in Part VIII.
As a matter of timing, it will be common that we would know whether
an offender has earned membership in the responsible offender group by
the time he or she reaches sentencing, but this ought not be an absolute
limit. An offender could gain membership several years later, for example,

42. David Ferrara, Woman Accused in Videotaped Sex Attacks Agrees to Plead Guilty, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW -JOURNAL (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-lasvegas/woman-accused-in-videotaped-sex-attacks-agrees-to-plead-guilty/.
43. As we have discussed elsewhere, one can argue that in some cases genuine remorse
does reduce an offender’s blameworthiness and therefore the amount of his deserved
punishment. Paul H. Robinson & Muhammad Sarahne, The Opposite of Punishment:
Imagining a Path to Public Redemption: Imagining a Path to Public Redemption, 73 RUTGERS
U. L. REV . 1 (2020) [hereinafter Robinson & Sarahne, The Opposite of Punishment].
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after deciding to do the right thing and reveal the location of bodies to
murder victim’s families.
Before considering how one might recognize and reward responsible
offenders, consider three other kinds of offenders whose positive postoffense behavior should also be acknowledged and rewarded.

V . T H E D E B T - P A I D O F F E N D E R–—S U F F E R I N G T H E F U L L
PUNISHMENT DESERVED

Some offenders successfully avoid receiving the punishment they deserve.
Perhaps they have access to elite defense counsel who can cut a particularly
good deal with prosecutors.44 Alternatively, tens of thousands of prisoners
have been released because of prison overcrowding or to reduce the state’s
increasing costs of corrections or for some other reason unrelated to the

44. The case of Robert Braxton is an example of how having the right attorney can help
avoid the deserved punishment. Braxton abused his ex-girlfriend and her young children,
which included chocking, punching, and throwing objects, in addition to verbal assault.
Even the sentencing judge noted that during her testimony, the ex-girlfriend, Tondalo Hall,
seemed to fear her ex-boyfriend. Yet, in a deal with prosecutors, he pleaded guilty only to
injuring their three-month-old daughter and received two years in prison—a ten-year
sentence of which eight years were suspended. That the facts of the case were wellestablished seems to be supported by the fact that the ex-girlfriend, herself a victim of
Braxton’s violence, was prosecuted for failing to protect the children from Braxton’s abuse,
although there was no evidence indicating that she had harmed her children in a way.
Represented by a different attorney, she pled guilty without a negotiated prosecutor promise
of leniency, resulting in a thirty-year sentence. As of July 2019, ﬁfteen years after the
sentence, she was still in prison. Her attempts to modify her sentence through appeal,
post-conviction relief, or clemency were so far in vain. Megan Lambert, A Father Abuses
His Children but Somehow Their Mother Goes to Prison for 30 Years, ACLU (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/sentencing-reform/father-abuses-his-childrensomehow-their-mother-goes-prison-30; Group Fights to Free Abused Mother Who Failed to
Report Child Abuse, OKLAHOMA ’S NEWS 4 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://kfor.com/2015/03/30/
group-spotlights-unequal-sentence-in-oklahoma-child-abuse-case/; Alex Campbell, This
Battered Woman Wants to Get Out of Prison, BUZZ F EED NEWS (Nov. 11, 2014), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alexcampbell/this-battered-woman-wants-to-get-out-ofprison; The Heartbreaking Case of Tondalao Hall, ACLU OKLAHOMA (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.acluok.org/en/news/heartbreaking-case-tondalo-hall; Archiebald Browne and
Tres Savage, After 15 Years Tondalo Hall Clears Commutation Hurdle, NON D OC (Jul. 16,
2019) https://nondoc.com/2019/07/16/tondalo-hall-clears-commutation-hurdle/.
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punishment deserved by the released offender.45 There could be any number of reasons an offender receives less punishment than deserved, and the
reasons for this may have nothing to do with the offender’s good or bad
behavior. Many other offenders, however, receive the full punishment they
deserve (or even much more than they deserve).
Whatever the reason an offender may have escaped the punishment he
or she deserves, those offenders who have not escaped, the debt-paid offenders, ought to receive recognition for that and preferential treatment over
debt-unpaid offenders. All other things being equal, they ought to have
a prior claim to opportunities and resources in acknowledgment of their
debt-paid status. For example, if there are limited resources to support
education, training, therapy, reintegration, and the like, as there commonly
are, then it would seem right that the debt-paid offender ought to have
a greater claim to that support than the debt-unpaid offender. Unfortunately, the system routinely ignores the importance of this distinction.
It is not uncommon, for example, for prisoners (more likely to be debtpaid) to have more limited educational opportunities than probationers
(less likely to be debt-paid). For example, one federal survey of state facilities found that only 27 percent of state and private prisons and 3 percent of
jails had college courses available to prisoners. Only 56 percent of state
prisons, 44 percent of private prisons, and 7 percent of jails had vocational
training programs available.46 In contrast, in addition to education grants
available from educational institutions themselves and from state governments, the federal government’s Pell Grant program provides educational
grants to almost any state probationer, but not to state prisoners.47

45. See, e.g., Don Thompson, Supreme Court Dismisses State’s Prison Overcrowding
Appeal, KQED NEWS (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.kqed.org/news/115011/supreme-courtdismisses-states-prison-overcrowding-appeal (California was ordered in 2013 to reduce
prison population by 9,600); John Moritz, 19,500 Inmates Get Early Release—1987 Law
Blamed for Record-Breaking Total, FORT WORTH STAR -TELEGRAM (Oct. 7, 1998), https://
infoweb-newsbank-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/apps/news/document-view?
p¼AWNB&docref¼news/0EB042DCA97D4D4C.
46. Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations, Special Report—
Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice (Jan. 2003/rev. Apr. 15, 2003), Table
3, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf.
47. See Can a Felon Qualify for a Pell Grant?, JOBS FOR FELONS HUB , https://www.
jobsforfelonshub.com/can-felon-qualify-pell-grant/#ixzz5ty2GKXjA. Offenders are expressly
excluded from receiving Pell grants while incarcerated; id.
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Yet, as noted, it is more likely that offenders sent to prison have gotten at
least the punishment they deserve (if not more) than the similarly situated
offenders put on probation. We would argue that the debt-paid offender
has a greater claim to help with educational opportunities than the debtunpaid offender, but at very least, whatever level of educational opportunities is made available to probationers, such as through federal Pell Grants,
ought to also be made available to prisoners.
Ideally, sentencing judges, correctional ofﬁcials, probation and parole
supervisors, and other decision makers in the criminal justice process ought
to regularly give special credit to debt-paid offenders. Part VIII explores
how this might be done. By giving this special credit, the offender who did
not pay the debt due for reasons unrelated to him (like prison overcrowding) is not being punished; rather, the debt-paid offender is given a reward
that his or her status has earned. The debt-unpaid offender has already
gotten a reward that he does not deserve: escaping the punishment that he
rightfully should have borne.
A critical caveat applies here: The calculation of whether an offender has
received the full punishment he or she deserves cannot depend on whether
he or she has fully served the sentence imposed. Unfortunately, current
criminal liability and punishment rules and practices commonly violate the
principle of just punishment, which requires proportionality between the
amount of punishment imposed and the offender’s overall blameworthiness, taking into account all mitigations and excuses. It is common for
current American criminal justice to deviate from the principle of blameworthiness proportionality in order to promote one crime-control strategy
or another,48 or sometimes simply out of ignorance or miscalculation.
Typical crime-control-inspired doctrines that regularly overpunish
include such things as mandatory minimum sentences, three-strike statutes, the felony-murder rule, use of strict liability, narrowing or abolishing
the insanity defense, holding minor accomplices to the same liability as the
perpetrator, and a host of others. The practical effect of this for our purposes is that a large number of offenders who have not completed their
sentence (or have been released early because of prison overcrowding or
some other reason apparently unrelated to their blameworthiness) can
nonetheless rightfully claim to be debt-paid offenders.
48. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL , LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE : WHY
CRIMINAL LAW DOESN ’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 117–36 (2005).

AFTER THE CRIME: REWARDING OFFENDERS’ POSITIVE

|

Even offenders who receive probation may claim debt-paid status if their
offense is not serious. Any intrusion on liberty—whether house arrest,
ankle-bracelet monitoring, curfew, community service, required drug
counseling, or any other non-incarcerative sanction—must be given some
punishment credit in proportion to its punitive bite. Thus, if the total
punishment deserved is modest, it can be fully satisﬁed through minor
sanctions.
The logical corollary to this, of course, is that some legal doctrines,
like the exclusionary rule or various non-exculpatory defenses, can have
the effect of reducing liability and punishment even though the
offender does not deserve such mitigation. For example, the exclusionary rule might bar the introduction of compelling and reliable evidence
of intent to kill required for murder, leaving the offender liable for only
manslaughter or negligent homicide. For example, Edward Coolidge
was convicted of ﬁrst-degree murder for killing fourteen-year-old Pamela Mason, and sentenced to life in prison. The United States
Supreme Court overturned his conviction based on the exclusionary
rule because the search warrant, through which key evidence had been
obtained, was invalid. As a result, the prosecutors in New Hampshire
negotiated a plea bargain with him, under which he agreed to plead
guilty for second-degree murder, thus serving twenty years rather than
life.49
In such cases, the principle described above suggests that the offender in
such a case cannot qualify as deserving debt-paid status by serving a sentence appropriate for manslaughter. If we are to look beyond the legal rules
to the offender’s actual blameworthiness, then we must do so not only
when his deserved punishment is less than his sentence—a fairly common
situation—but also when his deserved punishment is more than his sentence—a somewhat unusual situation.
One might properly observe that people can disagree about the amount
of punishment deserved in any particular case, rendering membership in
the group of debt-paid offenders subject to disagreement. But there are
some basic principles that properly guide the judgment of deserved
punishment.
49. Scary Stories, The Murder of Pamela Mason, QUOTEV , https://www.quotev.com/
story/10164249/Scary-Stories/31; Jeff Woodburn, The Crucial Coolidge Case, NHMAGAZINE .
COM (Jun. 19, 2014), https://www.nhmagazine.com/the-crucial-coolidge-case/.
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Most importantly, the punishment deserved is that proportionate to the
overall blameworthiness of the offender, taking into account all relevant
factors including the seriousness of the offense and the culpability and
capacities of the offender.50 The empirical evidence suggests that there is
a good deal of agreement on the rank ordering of the seriousness of
offenses,51 but it is true that there is disagreement about the general severity
of punishment within the criminal justice system. But once the system
commits itself to a general severity level—even if it might change that level
in the future—one can use that present severity level together with the
rank-ordering principle of blameworthiness proportionality to judge the
deserved punishment in any given case.
As a practical matter, these guiding principles suggest at minimum that
an offender can reasonably claim debt-paid status if his or her punishment
has been at least as much as similarly situated offenders in the jurisdiction.
Beyond that, the offender can claim that the criminal law rule upon which
his or her punishment has been based is one that violates the blameworthiness proportionality principle—such as mandatory minimum sentences,
three-strike statutes, or any of the other crime-control doctrines deviating
from desert discussed above. In Part VIII, we propose a grand-jury-like
panel of citizens to make this judgment where the criminal justice decision
maker has refused a request by an offender to be recognized as a member of
the debt-paid group. And we are happy to defer to that panel’s judgment
on this issue.
Note that the existence of this formal category provides a useful opportunity to contrast current criminal law and sentencing rules and practices
with true blameworthiness proportionality. It is a mechanism by which the
current system’s conﬂict with true desert can be regularly illustrated and
advertised. Perhaps the long-term effect of recognizing this formal category
would be to cause legislators, judges, prosecutors, and others to focus on
true blameworthiness, because under the system proposed here—under
50. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Proposed Final Draft, § 1.02
(Apr. 10, 2017), approved at American Law Institute’s 2017 Annual Meeting, on May 24,
2017; Paul H. Robinson, Mitigations: The Forgotten Side of the Proportionality Principle, 57
HARV . J. ON LEGIS . 219 (2020); PAUL H. ROBINSON , DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW , WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED AND HOW MUCH 138–40 (2008).
51. Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conﬂict in Intuitions of
Justice, 91(6) MINN . L. REV . 1829, 1854–65 (2007); PAUL H. ROBINSON , INTUITIONS OF
JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 23–28 (2013).
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which an offender can gain recognition as a debt-paid offender before his
sentence is complete—ofﬁcials may come to appreciate that each instance
of deviation from desert that they generate may come back to haunt them
later during the debt-paid inquiry where their over-punishment will be
exposed and advertised.
As a matter of timing, an offender’s membership in the debt-paid group
can be determined upon completion of the prison term, when the remaining sanctions, such as parole restrictions, are known. In practice, however,
given the large number of instances of overpunishment—due to the crimecontrol doctrines routinely generating disproportionate punishment—it is
likely to be quite common that an offender can become a member of the
debt-paid group while still in prison.

V I . T H E R E F O R M E D O F F E N D E R–—L E A V I N G
CRIMINALITY BEHIND

An even more compelling case for special recognition and reward is the
offender who has not only paid his or her debt but has gone further to do
what is necessary to avoid future criminality. An offender may be debt-paid
for his past offense yet just as inclined to commit another offense if the
opportunity arises. In contrast, some offenders have taken steps that eliminate or dramatically reduce the likelihood of future criminality. That
critical step, by the reformed offender, ought to be strongly supported,
praised, and rewarded beyond whatever is done for the debt-paid offender.
Unfortunately, the system does not always make this critical distinction
between the reformed and unreformed offender, and fails to give reformed
offenders the credit they deserve. Michael Hawkins, a graduate of trade
school and a skilled maintenance worker, applied for a facilities maintenance job at a community college. The school knew his work and wanted
to hire him but due to prior convictions for “selling nickel bags of weed and
breaking into abandoned buildings 30 years ago,” Ohio state law prevented
the school from giving him the job.52 Statutes that control collateral

52. Olivera Perkins, Collateral Sanctions reform law will make it easier for job seekers with
felony records to get hired, PLAIN DEALER REPORTER (Oct. 13, 2012), https://www.cleveland.
com/business/2012/10/collateral_sanctions_reform_la.html.
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consequences, like this Ohio law, ought to recognize the important distinctions between reformed and unreformed offenders.
In another case, popular mayor of Racine, Wisconsin, Jim Smith was
running for re-election when a forty-year-old conviction for a $48 dollar
theft came to light, barring him under state law from seeking re-election.53
The popular mayor had clearly reformed himself, and again, state statutes
governing collateral consequences, such as eligibility for public ofﬁce,
ought to recognize the importance of the distinction between reformed
and unreformed offenders.
To qualify as a reformed offender, it is not enough for the person to
simply claim they will not commit another offense. The person must take
afﬁrmative steps to assure that he or she will avoid criminality in the
future. This might include training, education, treatment, change of
location, job, or acquaintances, or anything else that will avoid the situation that brought about the original criminal offense. If the most effective reform mechanisms are not available to him, he must nonetheless
take whatever afﬁrmative steps he can to avoid future criminality. That is,
he must do something more than just grudgingly go along with whatever
the system requires of him.
As to the matter of timing, an offender might qualify as a member of this
group at any time after commission of the offense. However, as a practical
matter, it seems likely that such a change of character is unlikely to be
sufﬁciently clear so as to persuade a decision maker of true reform until
some time later. The truth is that reform can take time.
To summarize, the fact that an offender has reformed him- or herself
deserves acknowledgment and reward. All other things being equal,
a reformed offender deserves priority over the non-reformed offender in
access to resources and opportunities.

V I I . T H E R E D E E M E D O F F E N D E R–—L I V I N G R E M O R S E
AND ATONEMENT

The ﬁnal category of offender who deserves recognition and reward is
a special case: an offender who is not only debt-paid and reformed but
53. Racine Mayor’s Past Burglary Might Prevent Re-Election Bid, WISCONSIN STATE
JOURNAL (Oct. 17 1997), https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/401506737/.
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also has gone further to demonstrate his or her sincere remorse and worked
to atone for the offense. As we have argued elsewhere,54 the redeemed
offender has acted in so admirable a way as to deserve a special form of
recognition and reward.
We have recommended elsewhere that the transformation in the redeemed offender be publicly acknowledged and celebrated in a ceremony
as public as a trial and conviction, that the record of the conviction be
updated to show the public redemption, and that, absent special circumstances, all collateral consequences of conviction be dropped.55
Unfortunately, as with the three previous categories of offenders, it is
common for such extraordinarily positive post-offense conduct to be
ignored. For example, compare these two cases from the same jurisdiction.
In the ﬁrst, Starlesha Lewis drives into a child, killing it, and leaves the
scene. She has been arrested on several other occasions for dangerous
driving. She brags on social media about how many accidents she has been
in. Before she is ﬁnally caught and convicted for killing the child, she is
charged three additional times for driving dangerously. She receives a sentence of 18 months.
In the second case, arising in the same jurisdiction, Matthew Cordle kills
a man while driving drunk. He checks himself into a rehabilitation facility,
stops all consumption of alcohol, and then makes a video in which he
admits his guilt and turns himself into authorities. After sentencing, Cordle
tells the court, “It should have been me instead of an innocent man. I vow
that I’ll do everything I can to prevent it from happening again and his
memory from fading.” The wife of the deceased is persuaded that Cordle is
genuinely remorseful. Victims of other drunk drivers write to the judge to
explain how meaningful to them is Cordle’s apology and taking responsibility. After his sentencing, Cordle says, “I’m going to do everything I can
to walk out of prison a better man than I walked in.” In prison he begins
a social media campaign called saveyourvictim to encourage others to take
responsibility for preventing anyone from drunk driving. He is sentenced
to 6½ years, with no chance of early release and a lifetime suspension of his
driver’s license.56 Cordle certainly deserves punishment for his offense, but
54. Robinson & Sarahne, The Opposite of Punishment, supra note 43.
55. Id. at 11–13.
56. Kisa Mlela Santiago, Man who Confessed to Drunken Driving in Viral Video gets 6½
Years, HlNTV .COM (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/23/justice/ohio-dui-
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it seems inappropriate that this genuinely remorseful offender seeking to
atone should be punished so much more than Starlesha Lewis, who shows
no remorse.
In another case, Michelle Jones is a teen mother caring for a disabled son
by herself when her poor parenting leads to his death. She goes to prison,
devotes herself to becoming a better person, and takes advantage of all of
the educational opportunities available within the correctional system,
beginning with getting a high school diploma through getting an undergraduate college degree. In an attempt to atone for her past crime, she
devotes herself to helping other inmates in their education and in their
reform. She earns a reputation at the prison and beyond as someone who is
truly remorseful and seeks to devote her life to atone for her offense. Upon
release, she is accepted into a Harvard PhD program, but before classes
begin Harvard withdraws its offer because of their assessment of her culpability for her original offense.57 It would be useful to have statutes that
prohibit or at least discourage this kind of discrimination if an offender has
truly met the demanding requirements we set out to be judged a redeemed
offender.
As a matter of timing, an offender might satisfy the strict requirements
for public redemption at any time after conviction but, like reform, as
a practical matter true atonement is likely to take some time.

VIII. TAKING ACCOUNT OF AN OFFENDER’S POSITIVE
POST-OFFENSE BEHAVIOR

The previous four sections have argued that some offenders because of their
positive post-offense conduct ought to be acknowledged and rewarded in
some way. One could leave this as a simple principle of direction to
criminal justice decision makers—sentencing judges, correctional ofﬁcials,
probation and parole supervisors, and others, including perhaps clemency
and pardon boards—to take such positive post-offense conduct into
confession-sentencing/index.html; Matthew Cordle Sentenced to 6.5 years in Prison, https://
becauseisaidiwould.com/mattssentence/.
57. Janna Malamud Smith, Harvard’s Cowardly Rejection of Michelle Jones, WBUR (Sep.
21, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2017/09/21/harvard-michelle-jones-jannamalamud-smith. Jones disputed their assessment that led to the revocation of their offer,
but Harvard was unmoved.
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account. Or, one could try to imagine some more ambitious system that
tried to distinguish among the different groups of positive post-offense
conduct to provide greater rewards or at least higher priority for beneﬁt
or opportunity to the offenders with more impressive positive post-offense
records.
Even if one were to try to create such a more ambitious system, as
a practical matter the best way to do this may be to start by providing
discretionary application of a general principle of preferring positive postoffense offenders over others; then, after gaining some experience in such
application, trying to articulate more speciﬁc and nuanced application
rules.
Even without this experience, however, it might be a useful
thought experiment to try to brainstorm a bit about what such a more
nuanced system might look like, with the understanding that we
simply lack the current experience required to put such a system into
operation.
One could imagine a system in which criminal justice decision makers
recognize the four positive post-offense statuses discussed above—the
responsible offender, the debt-paid offender, the reformed offender, and
the redeemed offender—and grant some reward or preferential treatment
to such offenders, whether on the decision maker’s own initiative or upon
request of the offender, his representative, or a third party. If the immediate
decision maker refuses to recognize a status that the offender believes he or
she is entitled to, we could have a standing authority available to review the
case and render a decision.
Given the nature of the matters at issue, which commonly call for value
judgments of the community, such a standing authority would best be
a jury of some sort,58 such as the standing grand jury currently used to
return indictments and to help in larger investigations. Indeed, for economy’s sake, one might initially want to use the existing grand jury system
for this purpose. A standing grand jury could hear a large number of cases
in a single day, especially if most were submitted on written application
with written responses from interested parties. The post-offense grand jury
could in any given case choose to hear further evidence from live witnesses.
Because the determination does not carry the weight of criminal conviction
58. Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM . L. REV . 1124, 1138–48 (2005).
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and punishment, there would be little need for the unanimous verdict used
in criminal trials. A majority or some kind of supermajority ought to be
enough.59
The post-offense grand jury would not be responsible to determine the
nature and speciﬁcs of the reward, which would remain within the decision
maker’s authority, but would have the authority only to reverse a decision
maker’s decision to refuse to recognize the offender’s membership in one of
the four positive post-offense groups.60 Given the new and unique nature
of the inquiry, however, it would make the most sense to experiment with
a variety of procedures before committing to any one.61
Whatever the procedures one ends up using to determine positive postoffense status, the larger question is: What should be the beneﬁcial consequences that follow from membership in any one or more of the positive
post-offense groups?
The basic operating principle is simple enough: offenders who satisfy the
requirements for any positive post-offense group ought to be given priority,
all other things being equal, over offenders who have not earned membership in any of the groups. The “all other things being equal” caveat may be
a bit too strict. We would want members of positive post-offense groups to
have priority over nonmembers in as many cases as possible, but it must be
acknowledged that there will be some instances in which we will want to
allocate a resource or an opportunity to a nonmember, even over a member,
if, for example, the treatment program will be dramatically more effective
for the nonmember than for the member. With the exception of such cases
(of a special societal beneﬁt ﬂowing from award to a nonmember), the
59. We have elsewhere recommended a speciﬁc adjudication procedure for the redeemed
offender. Robinson & Sarahne, The Opposite of Punishment, supra note 43, at 17–19. But
because of the unique character of these cases and their relative infrequency as compared to
the other three positive post-offense categories, the redeemed-offender procedures would be
feasible or appropriate only for that group.
60. One also may want the grand jury to be able to reverse a decision to recognize
membership in a group and to grant a reward. For example, a third party may want to
challenge a decision to recognize and reward an offender by allowing license to possess
ﬁrearms, gain the right to adopt or have custody of a child, etc., where a challenging party is
able to show the grand jury that the offender does not in fact qualify for membership in the
group that would justify such a reward.
61. One can imagine that at sometime in the future, after accumulating a good deal of
experience in judging and accounting for positive post-offense conduct, one might want to
experiment with broadening the authority of the post-offense grand jury.
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system ought to give preference to members over nonmembers in as many
situations as possible.
The opportunities or beneﬁts that may be subject of this preference for
members is a long and varied list. It might include educational programs,
training programs, treatment programs, and other such opportunities,
most of which operate within the constraints of limited resources that
require choices among eligible offenders. Membership in one of the positive post-offense groups also might be used to give an offender some
beneﬁt in determining the method of punishment, such as the level of
restrictiveness of incarceration, the use of non-incarcerative sanctions, taking account of an offender’s preferences in the selection of sanctioning
methods (while not reducing the total punishment amount), or taking
account of an offender’s preference for sanctioning location, to give just
a few examples. Membership also might be used to reduce or mitigate the
extent of the collateral consequences of conviction that would otherwise
apply after the sentence is complete. Such collateral consequences may
include a wide variety of aspects of an offender’s life, including restrictions
on voting, business and occupational licensing, immigration and travel,
housing and residency possibilities, registration and reporting requirements, family and domestic rights, motor vehicle licensing, employment
and volunteering opportunities, educational grants and student aid, military service, jury service, eligibility for public welfare beneﬁts and food
stamps, and more.62
Unfortunately, most laws imposing collateral consequences on offenders
tend to ignore an offender’s positive post-offense conduct.63 For example,
federal law prohibits any person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year from possessing a ﬁrearm.64 Federal law also
denies assistance under state programs funded by the Social Security Act or
62. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV .
623, 635–36 (2006); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV . L. & SOC .
CHANGE 585, 586–87 (2006); Michael Pinard, Reﬂections and Perspectives on Reentry and
Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010).
63. For a comprehensive compilation of the collateral consequences imposed in all
American jurisdictions, see the National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
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beneﬁts under the supplemental nutrition assistance program to anyone
convicted of certain controlled-substance-related felonies.65 State laws
relating to collateral consequences also commonly ignore an offender’s
positive post-offense conduct. For instance, Arkansas law denies eligibility
to SNAP beneﬁts (food stamps) to any person found guilty of a felony
related to certain controlled-substance offenses.66 California law bans
adoptions by a person convicted of certain offenses or by a person living
with such an offender.67 In Alabama, a person who has been convicted of
a felony may not apply to be a private investigator.68 In Florida, the law
excludes students who have been convicted or adjudicated delinquent for
any felony, ﬁrst-degree misdemeanor, or some drug offenses, from eligibility for a tuition assistance program that aims to assist underprivileged
youth in their pursuit of post-secondary education.69 Under New York
law, a person who has been convicted of a felony cannot serve as a juror.70
Such statutes that impose collateral consequences upon conviction ought
to more frequently take into account an offender’s positive post-offense
conduct.
Even though some collateral consequences of conviction are discretionary, their governing statutes rarely provide guidance for the exercise of that
discretion, guidance that we think ought to recognize the importance of the
positive post-offense conduct categories described above. For example,
Alabama Fair Housing Law, which protects against discrimination in housing, provides that it “shall not prohibit conduct against a person because
the person has been convicted . . . of the illegal manufacture or distribution
of a controlled substance. . . . ”71 In Indiana, the State may use the results of
criminal history check of a child’s parent, guardian, custodian, or a household member thereof, to determine whether to approve a family reuniﬁcation or deny it.72 In applying these statutes, we think it is highly relevant
65. 21 U.S.C. § 862a.
66. Isabella Moller, Convicted Criminals Without Food Stamps, Continue in Crime Circle,
KARK.COM (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.kark.com/news/convicted-criminals-withoutfood-stamps-continue-in-crime-cycle/.
67. Cal. Fam. Code § 8712.
68. Code of Ala. § 34-25B-12.
69. Fla. Stat. § 1009.984.
70. NY CLS Jud § 510.
71. Alabama Code, Title 24, Housing § 24-8-7(f).
72. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-34-21-5.5(d).
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for the decision maker to take into account whether the offender is responsible, debt-paid, reformed, or redeemed.
One ﬁnal important issue concerns the priority given among the offenders who are members of more than one of the positive post-offense
groups. First, should offenders who are members of more than one group
have priority over offenders who are members of a fewer number of groups?
Second, should there be a hierarchy of preference for membership in some
groups over other groups?
As to the ﬁrst question, an offender might be responsible and debt-paid
but not reformed. Or, an offender might be just the opposite, not responsible and not debt-paid but nonetheless reformed. The point is that all
three of these forms of post-offense behavior exist independent of one
another. (The redeemed offender is a special case, because it essentially
requires, in addition to remorse and atonement, that the offender also be
debt-paid and reformed.73)
While membership in any one of the four groups ought to be acknowledged and rewarded, the rationale underlying the preference suggests that
offenders who are members of more than one group ought to get priority
over those who are members of only one. The offender who is responsible
and reformed ought to have preference over the offender who is responsible
but not reformed.
As to the second question, we would argue that there ought to be
a recognized priority of some groups over others: the redeemed offender
ought to be preferred over the others, the reformed offender ought to be
preferred over the debt-paid offender and responsible offender, and, arguably, the debt-paid offender ought to be preferred over the responsible
offender. The argument for this may best rest upon the claim that each

73. As a practical matter, it is probably also the case that in most cases the redeemed
offender will also be a member of the responsible offender group. A redeemed offender is
usually one who acquiesces in receiving the punishment he deserves, and refrains from for
maneuvering for a reduction in punishment that may call into question the genuineness of
his remorse. This obviously requires him not to engage in the type of post-offense misbehavior described in supra text accompanying notes 30–41 (Part II). This expectation for the
redeemed offender is subject to few caveats, however. For example, an offender may behave
badly during the time leading up to his conviction, and thus be excluded from the responsible offender group, but later feel genuine remorse and seek to atone, thereby getting the
status of the redeemed offender. Robinson & Sarahne, The Opposite of Punishment, supra
note 43, at 5.
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one of the statuses represents some greater exercise of will or achievement
than the one before it. To be a responsible offender, one need simply
refrain from further deceit or victimizing others. To be a debt-paid
offender, one must afﬁrmatively suffer the full deserved punishment. Being
a reformed offender requires a true exercise of will that is itself admirable.
And being a redeemed offender requires all of the above and more: a genuine sense of remorse and desire to atone.
The discussions above describe how positive post-offense conduct might
be acknowledged and rewarded through application of a general preference
principle that applies the same to all potential beneﬁts and opportunities.
But it is possible to supplement this general principle with additional
speciﬁc guidance relating to speciﬁc beneﬁts and opportunities. That might
be useful because the nature of the positive post-offense conduct may itself
logically suggest some particular beneﬁt or reward. In other words,
although membership in one of the positive post-offense groups ought
to yield a general preference for the member over the nonmember, for
multiple memberships over single memberships, and for certain groups
over other groups, a separate set of arguments may suggest that certain
speciﬁc beneﬁts ought to logically follow from certain positive post-offense
statuses.
For example, it would seem hard to dispute that a redeemed offender, or
even a reformed offender, ought to regain the right to vote. If the justiﬁcation for the original disenfranchisement is that it would be unwise to
have societal rules and leaders determined by lawbreakers who have willfully violated societal norms,74 the argument no longer applies to reformed
and redeemed offenders because they have now shown their acceptance and
respect for those societal norms. The same sort of arguments can be made
74. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections of City of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.
1967) (“The early exclusion of felons from the franchise by many states could well have
rested on Locke’s concept, so inﬂuential at the time, that by entering into society every man
‘authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislature thereof, to make laws for him as
the public good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as
to his own decrees) is due.’ A man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make
for his own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to
participate in further administering the compact. On a less theoretical plane, it can scarcely
be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not
take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the
prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider their
cases.”).
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about the need for post-sentence surveillance or reporting. What the
reformed and the redeemed offender have done logically suggests that such
conditions will commonly be unnecessary and inappropriate.
In contrast, these arguments do not apply to the debt-paid offender. Just
because an offender has paid his debt does not mean that he or she now has
a respect for societal norms or is no longer in need of surveillance or
supervision.75 Other potential beneﬁts or rewards might similarly have
a logical connection with one kind of positive post-offense group or
another.76
The same kind of logical connection might give preference to the
responsible or the debt-paid offender over the reformed or redeemed
offender. For example, some treatment and rehabilitation programs might
be particularly useful for the ﬁrst two groups, for whom they are designed,
but wasted on the last two groups, who are beyond needing them.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Although an offender’s conduct before and during the crime is the traditional focus of criminal law and sentencing rules, an examination of postoffense conduct can also be important in promoting criminal justice goals.
After the crime, different offenders make different choices and have different experiences, and those differences can suggest appropriately different
treatment by judges, correctional ofﬁcials, probation and parole supervisors, and other ofﬁcial decision makers.
Positive post-offense conduct ought to be acknowledged and rewarded.
The essay has described one kind of positive post-offense conduct—an
offender’s good deed unrelated to his or her offense—where acknowledgment and reward may be appropriate but are not appropriately provided
75. On the other hand, the failure to be a responsible offender or a debt-paid offender
ought not disqualify an offender from regaining his vote if he is indeed a reformed or
a redeemed offender. It is his status as a member of these last two groups that seems most
relevant to the disenfranchisement issue, not his failure to become a member of the ﬁrst two
groups.
76. For example, restricting certain offenders’ access to public housing may be justiﬁed
on protecting public safety grounds, and reducing security risks associated with some
criminal behaviors, like drug abuse. See Milena Tripkovic, Collateral Consequences of
Conviction: Limits and Justiﬁcations, 18(3) CRIMINOLOGY , CRIM . JUST . L & SOC ’Y 18, 20
(2017). These rationales, however, do not apply to the reformed or the redeemed offender.
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through the criminal justice system. Such a good-deed offender ought to
stand in the same position as a non-offender who does the same.
But the essay also describes four kinds of positive post-offense conduct
that merit special recognition and preferential treatment within the criminal justice system: the responsible offender, who avoids further deceit and
damage to others during the process leading to conviction; the debt-paid
offender, who suffers the full punishment deserved (according to true
principles of justice, not the sentence actually imposed); the reformed
offender, who takes afﬁrmative steps to leave criminality behind; and the
redeemed offender, who out of genuine remorse tries to atone for the
offense.
Although it would take some experience dealing with these issues before
one could realistically propose a system to give special accommodation for
positive post-offense conduct, one could, as a thought experiment, imagine
some basic features of such a system: general direction to decision makers
in the criminal justice process to give preference for positive post-offense
conduct of any of the four types, with a preference among members of
those types for offenders in multiple groups and a preference for offenders
in the later of the four groups over the earlier. Decisions refusing membership in a group could be appealed to a grand-jury-like body of citizens.
And the matters for which preference could be given could include a wide
range of issues, including, for example, the selection and shaping of sanctioning methods, giving preferential access to education, training, treatment, and other programs, and eliminating or restricting collateral
consequences of conviction that continue after the sentence is completed.
Such an acknowledgment and reward system for positive post-offense
conduct not only can serve to encourage such conduct but also can be
justiﬁed by principles of fairness and justice. Similarly situated offenders
commonly behave differently after their offense. Those who behave better
deserve to be treated better.

